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Abstract 
Firms' decisions about which goods to produce are often made at a more disaggregate level than the 
data observed by empirical researchers.  When products differ according to production technique or 
the way in which they enter demand, this data aggregation problem introduces a bias into standard 
measures of firm productivity.  We develop a theoretical model of heterogeneous firms endogenously 
self-selecting into heterogeneous products.  We characterize the bias introduced by unobserved 
variation in product mix across firms, and the implications of this bias for identifying firm and 
industry responses to exogenous policy shocks such as deregulation.  More generally, we demonstrate 
that product switching gives rise to a richer set of industry-level dynamics than models where firm 
product mix remains fixed. 
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1. Introduction
Product choice is one of the central business decisions made by a firm. Apple’s
decision to enter the market for personal music players with the iPod was a substantive
departure from its existing product mix and has received much attention.1 While
central to business strategy, firms’ decisions about which product markets to enter are
often made at a more disaggregate level than the data available to researchers. This
mismatch is important for the measurement of productivity because the products that
firms switch into may utilize diﬀerent production techniques — and display diﬀerent
consumer demand patterns — than the products firms leave behind. As a result,
variation in firms’ observed performance may be driven by unobserved product choices
in addition to underlying (and observable) firm characteristics.
This paper examines the implications of unobserved product-mix variation and
product switching for the measurement of firm- and industry-level productivity. We
develop a general equilibrium model of industry evolution where heterogeneous firms
endogenously self-select into asymmetric products within an industry. We demon-
strate that production-technology diﬀerences across products and product-choice vari-
ation across firms interact to bias standard superlative-index and production-function-
based estimates of firm productivity. This bias persists even if the econometrician can
observe and control for firm-specific variation in prices, inputs and output. Solving
the problem requires knowledge of the evolution of firms’ product mix over time.
We demonstrate that measured productivity diﬀerences across firms can be decom-
posed into a component due to true diﬀerences in firm productivity and a component
attributable to variation in production technology across products. Depending on
how product technologies vary, measured productivity dispersion can exceed or fall
short of true productivity variation. This finding suggests that diﬀerences in firms’
product mix may play a role in explaining the substantial within-industry variation
in firm productivity noted in many empirical studies.2 At the industry level, we
show that measured productivity depends upon the weight of products in consumer
utility. Changes in these weights cause estimated productivity to rise or fall even if
true industry productivity remains the same.
Our approach emphasizes the role of product choice by surviving firms — along
with ongoing entry and exit of firms — in mediating firm and industry responses to
exogenous shifts in public policy such as deregulation. We show that estimates of
1See, for example, ‘The Meaning of iPod’, The Economist, June 10th, 2004.
2See, for example, the survey in Foster et al. (2001).
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these responses are biased in the presence of unobserved product switching. Even
though true firm productivity is a parameter in the model and remains unchanged
during deregulation, firms may appear as if they are experiencing productivity growth
due to their endogenous decisions to switch products. For this reason, identification of
firm productivity growth as a result of policy reforms is incomplete unless information
on the goods firms produce before and after the reform is incorporated into the
analysis. More generally, we demonstrate that product switching gives rise to a
richer set of industry-level dynamics than models where firm product mix remains
fixed. In the framework we develop, deregulation generates aggregate (i.e., industry-
level) productivity growth through three channels: the exit of low productivity firms,
changes in the composition of output across firms that keep making the same product,
and changes in the relative importance of diﬀerent product markets within the same
industry. Accounting for these responses promotes more comprehensive evaluations
of public policy.
Our findings contribute to a wide range of research in the international trade,
productivity and macroeconomic growth literatures. A great deal of empirical work
in these fields has made use of plant- and firm-level datasets from production censuses
or surveys. These micro datasets have yielded many insights and are a considerable
improvement over the industry-level datasets that preceded them.3 Nevertheless,
most studies making use of microdata assign firms (or plants) to a single, relatively-
aggregate industry despite variation in firms’ underlying product mix.4 In the U.S.
manufacturing census, for example, BMW would be allocated to the four-digit Stan-
dard Industry Classification (SIC) 3711 “Motor Vehicles and Car Bodies” based on
the company’s main source of revenue, which is manufacturing passenger cars. But
passenger cars are only one five-digit product within this four-digit industry. Firms
producing buses, combat vehicles, tractors and a variety of truck categories would also
be found in SIC 3711.5 As a result, estimation of BMW’s productivity might involve
3Early studies using microdata include Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) and Baily et al. (1992).
4Exceptions are where detailed information on the product market is used, as for example in
Berry et al. (1995), Goldberg (1995) and Syverson (2004).
5Similarly, the UK four-digit industry called Manufacture of Motor Vehicles (UKSIC03
3410) includes passenger cars, buses, commercial vehicle and golf carts among others. See
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/methods_quality/sic/downloads/UK_SIC_Vol1(2003).pdf. Since
the UK system is designed to comply with Eurostat regulations on the common statistical classifi-
cation of economic activities (NACE), other European classification schemes face similar problems
of clustering dissimilar products within an industry. While attempts have been made to revise
industrial classifications to group products and industries by production processes, it remains in-
evitable that activities with heterogeneous production techniques and demand-side characteristics
are classified together.
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grouping it with defense contractors such as AM General which produces armor-
plated Humvees. The likely dissimilarity of production technologies and demand
patterns across products as diverse as passenger cars and combat vehicles highlights
the diﬃculties of using coarse industry classifications to identify firm productivity.
There is a long tradition in the industrial organization literature of analyzing en-
dogenous product choice, including Hotelling (1929), Lancaster (1966), Shaked and
Sutton (1982), Spence (1976) and Sutton (1998) among others. More recent research
by Berry et al. (1995), Hausman (1997), Petrin (2002) and Trajtenberg (1989) has
sought to quantify the welfare gains from new product introduction. Other work has
emphasized problems of measuring productivity using revenue data when firms oper-
ate in imperfectly competitive markets and charge diﬀerent prices, including Klette
and Griliches (1996), Levinsohn and Melitz (2002), Katayama, Lu and Tybout (2003),
De Loecker (2005) and Martin (2005).
A separate tradition has analyzed industry dynamics, where the Darwinian se-
lection of high productivity firms through entry and exit is central in determining
industry equilibrium, as in Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992) and Ericsson and
Pakes (1995). In contrast with the research noted above, product choice does not
feature prominently in this literature, where the decision to create a firm is equivalent
to the decision to enter a product market. One explanation for this diﬀerence may
be that models of industry dynamics solve for heterogeneous quantities and prices
across firms and trace the stochastic evolution of the firm productivity distribution.
Analyzing the dynamics of entire distributions in general equilibrium is a demanding
exercise. To allow heterogeneous firms to choose between products with diverse at-
tributes would be to introduce a further equilibrium distribution (the distribution of
products across firms) that must be analyzed over time.
We make progress in this direction by adopting a number of stark assumptions.
In particular, we build on Melitz’s (2003) model of industry equilibrium, which sub-
stantially simplifies industry dynamics by assuming a monopolistically competitive
industry structure where firms produce varieties of a single product, and by assuming
that firm productivity is a parameter which is drawn from a fixed distribution at the
point of entry, with firms facing a constant exogenous probability of death thereafter.
Into this structure we introduce a choice between two heterogeneous products with
diﬀerent production techniques. These products enter demand asymmetrically, and
their relative price is determined endogenously in general equilibrium. We believe
this to be the simplest framework for understanding the impact of product choice on
productivity measurement. It captures both product heterogeneity and self-selection
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by firms into product markets while yielding particularly tractable results.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 places the paper
in the context of the existing literature on deregulation, industry dynamics and pro-
ductivity. Section 3 develops the theoretical model. Section 4 solves for industry
equilibrium. Section 5 examines the properties of general equilibrium and derives
the bias in standard productivity measures. Section 6 examines the implications of
an exogenous policy reform, in the form of a reduction in barriers to entry, on prod-
uct choice, measured productivity growth at the firm-level and on aggregate industry
productivity growth. Section 7 concludes. An appendix at the end of the paper
collects together proofs and technical derivations.
2. Deregulation, Industry Dynamics and Productivity
A great deal of recent research in industrial organization and international trade
focuses on industry responses to deregulation and trade liberalization. The influen-
tial study of the U.S. telecommunications industry by Olley and Pakes (1996) and
the analyses of trade liberalization in Chile by Tybout et al. (1991) and Pavcnik
(2002) are prominent examples. An important contribution of this analysis is the
development of methodologies for consistent estimation of productivity when firms
endogenously choose factor inputs as well as whether or not to exit the industry
in response to changing market conditions and technology.6 The estimated values
of productivity that emerge from this literature show considerable dispersion across
plants and firms within narrowly defined industries as well as exit by low productivity
firms. Changes in the composition of output are found to play an important role in
the response of industries to exogenous changes in the policy environment. Pavcnik
(2002), for example, finds that aggregate productivity growth in Chile grew by 19.3
percent during the seven years following trade liberalization in 1979, with a contribu-
tion of 6.6 percent from increased productivity within plants and a 12.7 percent from
the reallocation of resources from less to more eﬃcient producers.
A related literature has argued that gross rates of firm entry and exit are large
relative to net rates, and that firm entry and exit play an important role in accounting
for aggregate productivity growth. Leading examples include Baily et al. (1992),
Davis and Haltiwanger (1991), Dunne et al. (1989), Disney et al. (2003) and Foster et
al. (2002). Foster et al. (2002), for example, find that virtually all of the productivity
growth in the U.S. retail trade sector during the 1990s is accounted for by more
6See in particular Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
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productive entrants displacing less productive exiters.
Finally, a separate body of research has emphasized the problems associated with
measuring productivity using revenue data when there is dispersion in output prices
across firms within industries, including work by Klette and Griliches (1996), Levin-
sohn and Melitz (2002), Katayama et al. (2003), De Loecker (2005), and Martin
(2005). In the presence of this price dispersion, deflating firm revenue using a com-
mon industry price deflator, as is common in empirical work, yields biased estimates
of firm productivity.
The theoretical model we develop in this paper incorporates all of these features:
heterogeneous firm productivity, ongoing entry and exit in steady-state, selection
on survival where exiting firms are on average of lower productivity, and imperfect
competition inducing variation in prices across firms. In addition, we incorporate
an additional feature of firm-level data not emphasized in existing research, namely
the idea that firm choices about which good to manufacture are typically made at
a more disaggregate level than the industry concordances according to which firms
are classified. These products often have diﬀerent production technologies and dis-
play heterogeneous consumer demand patterns, which mean that they are not well
modelled as diﬀerentiated varieties of the same product. Even if firm-specific data
on prices or information on physical quantities of output is available, measured firm
productivity is biased because it captures both true productivity diﬀerences across
firms as well as diﬀerences across products in production technique.
We illustrate the importance of these ideas by describing a particular micro
dataset, the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) of the U.S. Census Bureau. In
the LRD, manufacturing censuses are conducted every five years. Plants are allo-
cated to four-digit SIC industries, of which there are 457, according to the industry
that accounts for the main share of plant revenue. Information on output and inputs
such as employment, wages, physical capital, materials, and energy is reported at the
plant-level.
Existing research relying on the LRD generally focuses on plants’ primary indus-
tries.7 However, more detailed information on plant production is available. The
LRD also tracks the identity and output of plants’ five-digit SIC products, of which
there are 1462. To provide a sense of the relative level of detail between products
and industries, Table 1 lists the thirteen products captured by industry 3357, “Non-
ferrous Wire-Drawing and Insulating.” The products in this industry — which range
from Copper Wire (33571) to Fiber Optic Cable (33579) — diﬀer both in terms of end
7See, for example, Baily et al. (1992), Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) and Olley and Pakes (1996).
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use and in terms of the inputs and technologies required to manufacture them. The
current UK SIC2003 system also groups fiber optic and insulated wire cable under
the four-digit industry 3130, Manufacture of Insulated Wire and Cable.8
Table 2 provides a more systematic view of the level of product detail available
in the U.S. SIC by reporting the number of four- and five-digit categories in each
two-digit sector. The typical two-digit manufacturing sector has 24 industries and
76 products. However, there is a substantial degree of variation across sectors. The
number of five-digit products per two-digit sector ranges from a low of 12 in Leather
(31) to 187 in Industrial Machinery (35). Similarly, the number of five-digit products
per four-digit industry ranges from a low of 1.1 in Leather to a high of 5.1 in Printing
and Publishing (27). The industry highlighted in Table 1, Nonferrous Wiredrawing
and Insulating (3357), is just one of 26 Primary Metal industries, and its products
represent 14 percent (13/89) of the total number of products in that sector.
In the theoretical model developed below, we allow heterogeneous firms to endoge-
nously self-select into products that vary in terms of their demand and supply-side
attributes. Product choice is shaped by the interaction of the heterogeneous charac-
teristics of firms and products. The product chosen by the firm aﬀects its measured
productivity and its response to industry deregulation. The distribution of firms
across products influences measured industry productivity at a point in time. The
endogenous re-sorting of firms across products in response to industry deregulation
shapes the dynamic response of the industry as a whole to policy reform over time.
3. Theoretical Model
Consider a single industry within which consumers and firms choose whether to
consume and produce varieties of two distinct products.9 To keep the analysis as
tractable as possible, we assume that consumer preferences between the two products
8Even at further levels of disaggregation, e.g. seven-digit SIC categories, goods are often quite
distinct. For example, in the Motor Vehicles Parts and Accessories industry (3714), the five-digit
product “Gasoline Engines and Gasoline Engine Parts for Motor Vehicles, New” (37142) includes the
following seven-digit categories: “Intake Manifolds” (3714206), “Rocker Arms and Parts (3714215),
“Fuel Injection Systems” (3714218), and “Radiators, Complete” (3714235). These seven-digit
categories are likely to display heterogeneous technological requirements and to face diﬀerent patterns
of consumer demand. For a complete list of four-, five-, and seven- digit SIC87 categories, see U.S.
Census (1996) available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2/manmin/mc92-r-1.pdf.
9It is straightforward to embed this framework in a multi-industry model or to allow a finite
number of distinct products within the industry. The model developed here is the simplest frame-
work within which to demonstrate the importance of firms’ choice between heterogeneous products
in influencing measured firm and industry outcomes.
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can be well represented with the following CES utility function:
U = [aCν1 + (1− a)Cν2 ]
1/ν . (1)
where a captures the relative strength of preferences for each product, and we assume
that the products are imperfect substitutes with elasticity of substitution ψ = 1
1−ν >
1. Firms produce horizontally diﬀerentiated varieties of their chosen product. Ci is
therefore a consumption index defined over varieties ω of each product i:
Ci =
∙Z
ω∈Ωi
qi(ω)
ρdω
¸1/ρ
, Pi =
∙Z
ω∈Ωi
pi(ω)
1−σdω
¸1/1−σ
. (2)
where {Ωi} is the set of available varieties in market i, Pi is the price index dual to
Ci, and σ = 11−ρ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the same
product. We make the natural assumption that varieties of the same product are
more easily substitutable than diﬀerent products, so that σ > ψ.
Consumer expenditure minimization yields the following expression for equilib-
rium expenditure (equals revenue, ri(ω)) on a variety:
ri(ω) = Ri
µ
pi(ω)
Pi
¶1−σ
= αi (P)R
µ
pi(ω)
Pi
¶1−σ
(3)
which is increasing in aggregate expenditure (equals aggregate revenue R = R1+R2 =R
ω∈Ω1 r1(ω)dω +
R
ω∈Ω2 r2(ω)dω), increasing in the share of expenditure allocated to
product i, αi(P2/P1) = αi(P), decreasing in own variety price, pi(ω), and increasing
in the price of competing varieties as summarized in the price index, Pi.
With CES utility, the share of expenditure allocated to product 1 is increasing
in the relative price of product 2, P = P2/P1 (since ψ > 1), and increasing in the
relative weight given to product 1 in consumer utility, a:
α1 (P) =
"
1 +
µ
1− a
a
¶ψ
P1−ψ
#−1
, α2 (P) = 1− α1 (P) . (4)
3.1. Production
As well as entering demand in diﬀerent ways, the products have diﬀerent produc-
tion technologies. We consider the case where this diﬀerence in production technology
takes the form of a diﬀerence in the fixed and variable costs of production. We as-
sume that product 2 has a higher fixed cost of production: f2 > f1. Variable costs
are indexed by the parameter bi and, without loss of generality, we normalize b1 = 1
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and b2 = b. We allow variable costs of production for product 2 to be either smaller
or greater than those for product 1.
Labor is the sole factor of production and is supplied inelastically at its aggregate
level L , which also indexes the size of the economy. The production technology
follows Melitz (2003) in that variable cost is assumed to depend on heterogeneous
firm productivity. We diﬀer in that we allow for multiple distinct products and
hence endogenous product choice within the industry. The labor required to produce
qi units of a variety in product market i is given by:
li = fi +
biqi
ϕ
(5)
so that the variable cost of production depends on bi, which is common to all firms,
as well as on the firm-specific productivity, ϕ.10
The existence of fixed production costs implies that, in equilibrium, each firm will
choose to produce a unique variety. Profit maximization yields the standard result
that equilibrium prices are a constant mark-up over marginal cost, with the size of
the mark-up depending on the elasticity of substitution between varieties:
pi(ϕ) =
µ
σ
σ − 1
¶
wbi
ϕ
. (6)
We choose the wage as the numeraire so that w = 1. Using this choice of
numeraire and the pricing rule in the expression for revenue above, equilibrium firm
revenue and profits are:
ri(ϕ) = αi(P)R
µ
Piρ
ϕ
bi
¶σ−1
(7)
πi(ϕ) =
ri(ϕ)
σ
− fi.
One property of equilibrium revenue that will prove useful below is that the relative
revenue of two firms with diﬀerent productivity levels in the same product market
depends solely on their relative productivity: ri (ϕ00) = (ϕ00/ϕ0)
σ−1 ri (ϕ0). Similarly,
the relative revenue of two firms with diﬀerent productivity levels in diﬀerent product
markets depends on their relative productivities, the relative variable cost of making
10The assumption that fixed costs of production are independent of productivity captures the idea
that many fixed costs, such as building and equipping a factory with machinery, are unlikely to vary
substantially with firm productivity. As long as fixed costs are less sensitive to productivity than
variable costs, there will be endogenous selection on productivity in firms’ exit and product choice
decisions.
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the two products, the relative expenditure share devoted to the two products, and
relative price indices:
r2 (ϕ00) =
µ
1− α1(P)
α1(P)
¶ ∙µ
ϕ00
ϕ0
¶
P 1
b
¸σ−1
r1 (ϕ0) . (8)
3.2. Industry Entry and Exit
To enter the industry (and produce either product), firms must pay a fixed entry
cost, fe > 0, which is thereafter sunk. After paying the sunk cost, firms draw their
productivity, ϕ, from a distribution, g (ϕ), with corresponding cumulative distribution
G (ϕ). This formulation captures the idea that there are sunk costs of entering an
industry and that, once these costs are incurred, some uncertainty regarding the
nature of production and firm profitability is realized. Firm productivity is assumed
to remain fixed thereafter, and firms face a constant exogenous probability of death,
δ, which we interpret as due to force majeure events beyond managers’ control.11
A particularly tractable productivity distribution, which we use at some points
below and which provides a good approximation to observed firm-level productivity
data is the Pareto distribution, g (ϕ) = zkzϕ−(z+1). The parameter k > 0 corresponds
to the minimum value of productivity in the industry, while z > 0 determines the
skewness of the distribution, and in order for the variance of log firm sales to be finite
we require z > σ − 1.
After entry, firms decide whether to begin producing in the industry or exit. If
they decide to produce, they choose which product to make. The value of a firm with
productivity ϕ is, therefore, the maximum of 0 (if the firm exits) or the stream of
future profits from producing one of the two products discounted by the probability
of firm death:
v (ϕ) = max
½
0,
1
δ
π1 (ϕ) ,
1
δ
π2 (ϕ)
¾
. (9)
11Firm death ensures steady-state entry into the industry. New entrants make an endogenous exit
decision, since their decision whether or not to produce in the industry depends on their productivity
draw ϕ from the distribution g (ϕ). Together with fixed production costs, this will generate the result
that exiting firms are on average less productive than surviving firms. For incumbent firms, the
probability of death δ is independent of productivity. This assumption can be relaxed by allowing
firm productivity to evolve stochastically after entry (e.g. Hopenhayn 1992). While this would
achieve greater realism, it would not change the qualitative results below on the importance of
endogenous product choice for measured firm and industry productivity, and would come at the cost
of a substantial increase in the complexity of the industry dynamics.
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3.3. Product Choice
Firms decide which product to make based on their realized productivity, taking
as given aggregate variables such as the price indices. From our expression for
equilibrium profits above, firms with zero productivity have negative post-entry profits
and profits are monotonically increasing in productivity. Fixed production costs
mean that there is a positive value for productivity below which negative profits
would be made. Firms drawing a productivity below this zero-profit productivity
cutoﬀ, ϕ∗, exit the industry immediately.
From consumers’ utility function, the elasticity of substitution between products
is lower than the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the same product.
Therefore, in general equilibrium the relative price of the two products, P = P2/P1,
adjusts so as to ensure that both products are produced, as we show formally below.
Since product 2 has a higher fixed product cost than product 1, firms with zero
productivity would make the largest losses from producing product 2:
0 > π1 (0) = −f1 > π2 (0) = −f2. (10)
Since profits for each product are monotonically increasing in productivity, a nec-
essary condition for both products to be produced is that profits from product 2
increase more rapidly with productivity than those from product 1:
dπ2/dϕ
dπ1/dϕ
= Γ ≡
µ
1− a
a
¶ψ µ
1
b
¶σ−1
Pσ−ψ > 1 (11)
where the relative rate at which profits increase with productivity is independent of
productivity, and depends instead on parameters, such as the demand-shifter a and
the variable cost parameter b, as well as endogenous relative price indices, P.
The suﬃcient condition for both products to be produced is that profits are
positive in each product market and exceed those in the other product market over a
range of productivities:
π1(ϕ) > 0 and π1(ϕ) > π2(ϕ) for ϕ ∈ Φ1 ⊂ (0,∞) (12)
π2(ϕ) > 0 and π2(ϕ) > π1(ϕ) for ϕ ∈ Φ2 ⊂ (0,∞)
which requires the profit functions for the two products to intersect at a value for
productivity where positive profits are made, as shown graphically in Figure 1. As
we show formally below, endogenous relative prices, P, will adjust to ensure that
these conditions are satisfied even if product 2 has both a higher fixed and variable
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cost. The point at which the two profit functions intersect defines the product-
indiﬀerence productivity cutoﬀ, ϕ∗∗, at which a firm is exactly indiﬀerent between
the two products.
The higher fixed cost for product 2 and the requirement that the two profit func-
tions intersect at a value for productivity where positive profits are made together
imply that product 1 will be produced by the lowest productivity firms that are ac-
tive in the industry and product 2 will be produced by higher productivity firms.
The zero-profit productivity cutoﬀ determining the lowest level of productivity where
product 1 is produced is given by:
r1 (ϕ
∗) = σf1, (13)
while the product-indiﬀerence productivity cutoﬀ defining the lowest level of produc-
tivity where product 2 is produced is defined by:
r2 (ϕ∗∗)
σ
− f2 =
r1 (ϕ∗∗)
σ
− f1. (14)
Firms drawing a productivity below ϕ∗∗ but above ϕ∗ will make product 1, while
those drawing a productivity above ϕ∗∗ will make product 2.
3.4. Free Entry
From the characterization of entry and product choice in the previous sections,
the ex ante probability of successful entry into the industry is [1−G(ϕ∗)], with the ex
ante probability of producing product 1 given by [G(ϕ∗∗)−G(ϕ∗)], and the ex ante
probability of producing product 2 given by [1−G(ϕ∗∗)]. The ex post productivity
distribution for each product, µi(ϕ), is conditional on successful entry and product
choice and is a truncation of the ex ante productivity distribution, g(ϕ):
µ1 (ϕ) =
(
g(ϕ)
G(ϕ∗∗)−G(ϕ∗) if ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗)
0 otherwise
, (15)
µ2 (ϕ) =
(
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗∗) if ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗∗,∞)
0 otherwise
.
In equilibrium we require the expected value of entry in the industry, ve, to equal
the sunk entry cost, fe. The expected value of entry is the ex ante probability of
making product 1 times expected profitability in product 1 until death plus the ex
Products and Productivity 13
ante probability of making product 2 times expected profitability in product 2 until
death, and the free entry condition is:
ve =
∙
G (ϕ∗∗)−G (ϕ∗)
δ
¸
π1 +
∙
1−G (ϕ∗∗)
δ
¸
π2 = fe, (16)
where πi is expected or average firm profitability in product market i. Equilibrium
revenue and profit in each market are constant elasticity functions of firm productivity
(equation (7)) and, therefore, average revenue and profit are equal respectively to
the revenue and profit of a firm with weighted average productivity, r¯i = ri(eϕi)
and πi = πi(eϕi), where weighted average productivity, ϕ˜1(ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗) and ϕ˜2(ϕ∗∗), is
determined by the ex post productivity distributions, µi (ϕ), and is defined formally
in the Appendix.
3.5. Product and Labor Markets
The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a constant mass of firms entering
each period,Me, and a constant mass of firms producing within each product market,
Mi. In steady-state equilibrium, the mass of firms that enter and draw a productivity
suﬃciently high to produce in a product market must equal the mass of firms already
within that product market who die, yielding the following steady-state stability
conditions (SC):
[1−G(ϕ∗∗)]Me = δM2 (17)
[G(ϕ∗∗)−G(ϕ∗)]Me = δM1. (18)
The firms’ equilibrium pricing rule implies that the prices charged for individual
varieties are inversely related to firm productivity. The price indices are weighted
averages of the prices charged by firms with diﬀerent productivities, with the weights
determined by the ex post productivity distributions. Exploiting this property of
the price indices, we can write them as functions of the mass of firms producing a
product, Mi, and the price charged by a firm with weighted average productivity
within each product market, pi(eϕi):
P1 =M
1/1−σ
1 p1(eϕ1), P2 =M1/1−σ2 p2(eϕ2) (19)
In equilibrium, we also require that the demand for labor used in production, Lp,
and entry, Le, equals the economy’s supply of labor, L:
Lp + Le = L. (20)
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4. Industry Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize general equilibrium which is referenced by the
sextuple {ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗, P1, P2, R1, R2}, in terms of which all other endogenous variables
may be written. In the next section we analyze the properties of industry equilibrium
and the implications of product choice for measured firm and industry productivity.
In the following section we investigate the implications of industry deregulation, in
the form of a policy reform which reduces sunk costs of entry into the industry.
The equilibrium vector is determined by the following equilibrium conditions: the
zero-profit productivity cutoﬀ (equation (13)), the product-indiﬀerence productivity
cutoﬀ (equation (14)), free entry (16), steady-state stability ((17) and (18)), the
values for the equilibrium price indices implied by consumer and producer equilibrium
(equation (19)), and labor market clearing (20).
4.1. Relative Supply and Relative Prices
The zero-profit productivity cutoﬀ implies that the revenue of a product 1 firm
with productivity ϕ∗ is proportional to the product 1 fixed production cost (equation
(13)), while the product-indiﬀerence productivity cutoﬀ establishes a relationship
between relative revenue in the two markets at productivity ϕ∗∗ and the fixed costs
of producing the two products (equation (14)). Profit maximization implies that the
relative revenues of two firms making diﬀerent products depend solely on their relative
productivities, relative expenditure shares on the two products, relative price indices,
and relative variable costs of production (equation (8)).
Combining these three equations, we obtain a downward-sloping (supply-side)
relationship between two key variables: the relative value of the two productivity
cutoﬀs, ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗, and the relative price of the two products, P,
ϕ∗∗
ϕ∗
≡ Λ =
⎡
⎣
³
f2
f1
− 1
´
h¡
1−a
a
¢ψ ¡1
b
¢σ−1Pσ−ψ − 1i
⎤
⎦
1/(σ−1)
. (21)
Equation (21) is the mathematical statement of the relationship between the two
productivity cutoﬀs captured graphically in Figure 1. As ϕ∗∗ rises relative to ϕ∗, the
fraction of firms producing product 2 falls, and the fraction of firms producing product
1 increases. Equation (21) therefore yields the following intuitive comparative statics.
A higher value for the relative price, P, increases profitability in product 2 relative
to product 1 and causes the relative number of firms producing product 2 to rise,
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i.e. a reduction in ϕ∗∗ relative to ϕ∗, since σ > ψ. For a given value for the relative
price, P, a higher fixed cost for product 2 , f2, reduces profitability in product 2 and
causes the relative number of firms producing product 2 to fall, i.e. an increase in
ϕ∗∗ relative to ϕ∗.
4.2. Relative Demand and Relative Prices
The expressions for the two price indices yield an equation for relative prices as
a function of the relative mass of firms and the relative price charged by a firm with
weighted average productivity in each product market (equation (19)). The two
steady-state stability conditions yield an equation for the relative mass of firms as a
function of the two productivity cutoﬀs (equations (17) and (18)).
Combining these expressions yields an upward-sloping demand-side relationship
between the relative value of the two productivity cutoﬀs and the relative price of the
two products:
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An increase in the relative consumer price index for product 2, P, reduces demand
for product 2 relative to product 1 and shrinks the range of productivities where
product 2 is produced relative to the range where product 1 is produced, i.e. an
increase in ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗. For a given value of ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗, an increase in b, the relative variable
cost for product 2, raises the price of product 2 varieties relative to product 1 varieties,
i.e. an increase in P.
4.3. Free Entry
The free entry condition can be written in a more convenient form using the ex-
pression for the zero-profit productivity cutoﬀ, the relationship between the revenues
of firms producing varieties in the same market with diﬀerent productivities, and the
supply-side relationship between the two productivity cutoﬀs derived above. Com-
bining equation (13), ri (ϕ00) = (ϕ00/ϕ0)
σ−1 ri (ϕ0), and equation (21), we can write the
free entry condition as:
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where Λ is defined in equation (21).
This way of writing the free entry condition clarifies the relationship between the
sunk cost of entry and the zero-profit productivity cutoﬀ. An increase in the sunk
entry cost, fe, requires an increase in the expected value of entry, ve. Since the
expected value of entry above is monotonically decreasing in ϕ∗, this requires a fall in
the zero-profit productivity cutoﬀ. Intuitively, the higher sunk cost of entering the
industry reduces the mass of entrants, which increases ex post profitability, enabling
lower productivity firms to cover their fixed production costs and survive in the
industry.
4.4. Steady-state Stability, Labor Market Clearing and Goods Market Clearing
Using the steady-state stability conditions to substitute for the ex ante probability
of producing each product in the free entry condition, total payments to labor used
in entry equal total industry profits: Le = Mefe = M1π¯1 +M2π¯2 = Π (by choice of
numeraire, w = 1). The existence of a competitive fringe of potential entrants means
that firms enter until the expected value of entry equals the sunk entry cost, and as
a result the entire value of industry profits is paid to labor used in entry.
Total payments to labor used in production equal the diﬀerence between industry
revenue, R, and industry profits, Π: Lp = R−Π. Taking these two results together,
total payments to labor used in both entry and production equal industry revenue,
L = R. Substituting for R in the expressions for Le and Lp above, this establishes
that the labor market clears.
In equilibrium we also require the goods market to clear, which implies that the
value of expenditure equals the value of revenue for each product. Utility max-
imization implies that the consumer allocates the expenditure shares α1 (P) and
(1− α1 (P)) to the two products. Imposing expenditure equals revenue for each
product, goods market clearing may be expressed as:
R1 = α1(P)R, R2 = (1− α(P))R. (24)
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4.5. Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Proposition 1 There exists a unique value of the equilibrium vector {ϕ∗ , ϕ∗∗ ,P1,
P2, R1, R2}. All other endogenous variables of the model may be written as functions
of this equilibrium vector.
Proof. See Appendix
Combining the supply-side relationship between the relative productivity cutoﬀs
and relative prices in equation (21) with the demand-side relationship in equation
(22) yields a unique equilibrium value of ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗ and P = P2/P1. In the proof of
Proposition 1, we establish that at the unique equilibrium value of P, ϕ∗ > 0 and
ϕ∗∗ > ϕ∗, so that both products are produced in equilibrium.
5. Properties of Industry Equilibrium
5.1. Endogenous Selection Into Product Markets
Proposition 2 There is non-random selection into product markets, whereby high
productivity firms produce the high fixed cost product.
Proof. See Appendix.
Firms endogenously sort into products based on their heterogeneous character-
istics and the diverse attributes of products. As shown in Figure 1 only higher
productivity firms find it profitable to produce the higher fixed cost product. The
value for productivity at which the higher fixed cost product is produced depends
on the exogenous parameters of the production technology and endogenous relative
prices. Because consumers have a taste for each product, and the elasticity of substi-
tution between products is lower than between varieties of the same product, relative
prices adjust so that both products are produced in equilibrium, even if one of the
products has both a higher fixed and variable cost.
With a Pareto productivity distribution, the demand-side relationship between
relative prices and the relative value of the productivity cutoﬀs in equation (22)
simplifies to yield the following expression for relative prices:
P = b [(ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗)γ − 1]1/σ−1 . (25)
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Combining this demand-side relationship with the supply-side relationship be-
tween relative prices and the two productivity cutoﬀs in equation (21), we obtain the
following expression for the relative value of the two productivity cutoﬀs as a function
of parameters alone:
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This expression implicitly defines the equilibrium value of ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗ > 1. In the
framework developed here productivity, ϕ, is the heterogeneous firm characteristic
and fixed costs, variable costs and the weight of products in demand, {fi, bi, a} , are
the diverse product attributes that determine the endogenous selection of products
by firms. The eﬀect of each of these parameters on product choice is mediated by the
elasticity of substitution between products, ψ, the elasticity of substitution between
varieties of each product, σ, and the degree of skewness of the Pareto distribution, γ.
Increases in the fixed cost of production for product 2 relative to product 1, f2/f1;
increases in the variable cost of production for product 2 relative to product 1, b;
and increases in the weight of product 1 in consumer utility, a, increase ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗ and
reduce the range of productivities where product 2 is produced.
The point that product choice is shaped by the interaction of heterogeneous firm
and product characteristics and results in a non-random distribution of firms across
products is clearly very general. In the remainder of this section, we trace the bias
in firm and industry productivity measures that inevitably result unless the empirical
researcher can observe which products are made by which firms or can combine a
structural model of product choice and industry evolution with an observable exoge-
nous variable that determines firm product choice but does not aﬀect firm performance
conditional on product choice.
5.2. Product Choice and Firm Productivity
Standard superlative productivity indices (Caves et al. 1982a,b) assume constant
returns to scale and perfect competition to derive a primal measure of productivity
from the relationship between output and factor inputs or a dual measure of produc-
tivity from the relationship between prices and factor costs. With a single factor
of production, as in the model developed here, the dual productivity index takes the
form:
lnA (ω) = lnw − ln p (ω) (27)
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where A (ω) denotes total factor productivity (TFP) and ω indexes firms. Therefore,
a lower value of prices relative to factor costs corresponds to a higher value of TFP.
The true relationship between prices, wages and firm productivity in the model is
governed by the equilibrium pricing rule in equation (6) so that the superlative index
number measure of TFP captures not only true diﬀerences in firm productivity ϕ (ω),
but also variation in the variable cost of production parameter bi across products,
and the size of the mark-up of price over marginal cost (σ/ (σ − 1)):
lnA (ω) = ln
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σ − 1
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bi
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Proposition 3 Measured productivity diﬀerences across firms can be decomposed into
a component due to true diﬀerences in firm productivity and a component due to
variation in production technique across products.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 1 If the high fixed cost product has lower variable costs, non-random se-
lection into products by firms magnifies the measured dispersion of productivity across
firms.
Proof. See Appendix.
From equations (27) and (28), the measured relative productivity of two firms
making diﬀerent products will reflect not only the true diﬀerence in productivity
between the firms, ϕ0/ϕ00, but also the diﬀerence in variable costs between the two
products, b ≡ b2/b1. Since high productivity firms make high fixed cost products,
it follows that if high fixed costs are associated with low variable costs, endogenous
product choice will magnify the measured dispersion in productivity across firms.
Conversely, if high fixed costs are associated with high variable costs, endogenous
product choice will compress the measured dispersion in productivity levels across
firms.
Therefore, when firms endogenously choose between products with heterogeneous
techniques, standard index number measures of TFP will be systematically biased.
While we have shown the bias using a dual measure based on prices and factor costs,
the same bias will aﬀect the primal measure based on output and factor inputs.
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Though these standard TFP measures are widely used in empirical work, it might be
objected that there are a number of more sophisticated measures of TFP that seek to
control for a variety of measurement issues. In particular, it is possible to correct for
imperfect competition (Hall 1988, Roeger 1995), increasing returns to scale (Klette
and Griliches 1995), and the absence of firm-specific price data (Klette and Griliches
1995, Levinsohn and Melitz 2002, De Loecker (2005) and Martin 2005). Furthermore,
rather than measuring productivity using index numbers, a related literature obtains
TFPmeasures from production function estimation (Olley and Pakes 1996, Levinsohn
and Petrin 2003).
While these techniques control for many sources of measurement error, we now
show that they do not eliminate the bias in productivity measures due to endogenous
product choice. Measures of imperfect competition control for the size of the mark-
up of price over marginal cost. Since to keep the algebra particularly tractable, we
have assumed both products have the same elasticity of demand across varieties, this
adjustment would eliminate the term ((σ − 1) /σ) from measured TFP in equation
(28). However, controlling for the size of the mark-up does not eliminate the bias
induced by diﬀerent products having diﬀerent production techniques, captured here
in the variation in the variable cost of production parameter bi. Furthermore, if we
enriched the model to allow diﬀerent products to have diﬀerent elasticities of demand,
mark-ups would need to be measured at the product level whereas, in much empirical
work, mark-ups are estimated for the industry as a whole.
Second, controlling for increasing returns to scale will not eliminate the bias in
productivity measures. The problem is that the fixed and variable cost parameters
which determine observed productivity and the degree of increasing returns to scale
vary across products. Any productivity measure that does not control for this vari-
ation will be biased. Third, the bias does not arise from price deflators only being
available at the industry-level and output being measured using revenue rather than
quantity data. The biases we derived above assumed that prices were observed at the
firm-level and we will show in the discussion of production function estimation below
that primal productivity measures will be systematically biased even if the physical
quantity of output is observed at the firm-level.
Fourth, production function estimation will not eliminate the biases in productiv-
ity measures derived here, even assuming that one can control for the simultaneity
of firm input choice as in the estimation techniques of Olley and Pakes (1996) and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The model implies the following relationship between
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physical quantities of output and factor inputs:
ln qi (ω) = lnϕ (ω)− ln bi + ln [li (ω)− fi (ω)] (29)
where i indexes products and ω indexes firms.
The identifying assumption typically made in production function estimation is
that production techniques are the same across firms up to a Hicks-neutral produc-
tivity shifter. Making this assumption, and imposing common slope coeﬃcients on
the factor inputs, the residual from the production function estimation is used as a
measure of TFP. In the one-factor model considered here, the regression specification
would be:
ln q (ω) = α+ β ln [l (ω)− γ] + u (ω) (30)
where the identifying assumption is that β and γ are the same across firms within
industries, and where the residual u (ω) is the measure of TFP.
This specification uses information on the physical quantity of output and allows
for increasing returns to scale. Nonetheless, the estimation will still yield biased
measures of firm productivity because it does not control for the fact that firms
make diﬀerent products within the industry and these products vary in terms of
their production techniques. The residual u (ω) will capture true variation in firm
productivity ϕ (ω) as well as variation in fixed and variable cost parameters across
products, bi and fi.
The fundamental problem aﬄicting all of the productivity measures considered in
this section is that firms make choices about disaggregated products and researchers
have typically used information about more aggregate industry activity at the firm.
The disaggregate products potentially vary both in production technique and in how
they enter demand. To eliminate the bias in dual and primal measures of productivity
would require the researcher to have firm-product level information on which products
are made by firms, the prices of each product, the price of factors used to produce
each product, the quantity of each product and the factor inputs used to produce each
product. These conditions will be met in a few industries where highly detailed data
are available, but are typically not met in the census and survey data on plants and
firms widely used by empirical researchers across fields as diverse as labor economics,
development economics, industrial organization and international trade.
In the absence of perfect data with firm-product line information, we consider two
examples where firm productivity can still be estimated consistently. If the researcher
can sort firms (or plants) into groups that make a single product, it becomes possible
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to measure productivity across firms making the same product. Either superlative
index numbers or production function estimation can be employed. Since the product
is the same across firms, one has eliminated the bias introduced into productivity
measures as a result of endogenous product choice. One would still need to control for
the measurement and estimation problems highlighted above: imperfect competition,
increasing returns to scale, the absence of firm-specific price data and the availability
of revenue rather than quantity data, and the simultaneity of factor input choice.
Alternatively, if the researcher knows which firms (or plants) make which prod-
ucts, consistent estimates of firm productivity may be obtained through production
function estimation by allowing the parameters of the production technology to vary
across firms making diﬀerent products. Again one would still need to control for the
measurement and estimation issues highlighted above. In particular, the method-
ologies of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) control for the
simultaneity of firm input use. The techniques of Levinsohn and Melitz (2002) ad-
dress the absence of firm-specific price deflators, although the implementation of these
techniques would now require product rather than industry-specific price deflators.
These two examples have empirical relevance, since the panel data on U.S. man-
ufacturing in the LRD includes information on which products are produced and the
value of shipments by product for individual plants that might be incorporated into
production function estimation.12
5.3. Product Choice and Industry Productivity
Measured industry productivity is the revenue-share weighted average of measured
firm productivity. Biases in measured firm productivity therefore lead to biases in
measured industry productivity. We illustrate this point using the standard su-
perlative index number measure of productivity introduced in the previous section
(equations (27) and (28)). However, as noted above, similar biases aﬀect other
measures of productivity where firm product choice cannot be explicitly observed or
controlled for within an appropriate structural model. From the expression for equi-
librium firm revenue in equation (7), the revenue share of a firm producing product
i with measured productivity Ai (ϕ) = (ρ/bi)ϕ is:
si [Ai (ϕ)] ≡
ri [Ai (ϕ)]
R
= αi (P)Ai (ϕ)σ−1 P σ−11 . (31)
12See Bernard et al. (2005) for an empirical analysis of variation in product mix across firms and
over time for the U.S. manufacturing sector.
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Therefore, measured industry productivity may be expressed as:
A¯ =
Z ϕ∗∗
ϕ∗
s1 [A1 (ϕ)]A1 (ϕ) g (ϕ) dϕ
G (ϕ∗∗)−G (ϕ∗) +
Z ∞
ϕ∗∗
s2 [A2 (ϕ)]A2 (ϕ) g (ϕ) dϕ
1−G (ϕ∗∗) . (32)
Proposition 4 Measured industry productivity depends on the weight of products
in consumer utility and changes in these weights will result in measured industry
productivity growth or decline.
Proof. See Appendix.
The weight of products in consumer utility, a, influences measured industry pro-
ductivity through a number of routes. First, these weights determine the zero profit
and product indiﬀerence cutoﬀ productivities, ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗, and hence the range of
productivities where each product is produced. The product with a lower variable
cost of production will have a higher measured productivity in equation (27). There-
fore, other things equal, the greater the range of productivities over which the lower
variable cost product is produced, the higher measured industry productivity. Sec-
ond, the weight of each product in consumer utility will aﬀect the share of revenue
received by a firm making each product. Other things equal, the larger the share
of revenue allocated to the product with the lower variable cost of production, the
higher measured industry productivity.
Since an increase in the weight of the low variable cost product in consumer util-
ity increases both the range of productivities where the product is produced and the
share of revenue received by producers of the product, it follows that a rise in this
weight generates measured industry productivity growth. Conversely, a fall in the
low variable cost product’s weight in consumer utility generates a decline in measured
industry productivity. Even though true firm-level productivity remains unchanged,
the endogenous re-sorting of firms across products with diﬀerent production tech-
niques results in changes in measured industry productivity.
Because firms choose products at a more disaggregated level than observed by
the empirical researcher and these products diﬀer systematically in terms of their
technology, the demand-side becomes important in determining measured industry
productivity. Measured industry productivity depends on two sets of supply-side
considerations, the true distribution of productivity across firms and the parameters
of the production technology of the two products, as well as patterns of consumer
demand which influence heterogeneous firms’ non-random decision of which products
to produce.
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6. Deregulation and Industry Dynamics
The response of industries to policy reforms such as deregulation has been a ma-
jor focus of much recent research. In this section, we use the theoretical model of
industry equilibrium to show that endogenous product choice provides an important
additional decision margin along which heterogeneous firms adjust to industry dereg-
ulation, alongside firm entry and exit and changes in the composition of output across
firms of diﬀerent productivities within existing product markets. We show how the
endogenous sorting of firms across products may result in either measured produc-
tivity growth or decline at the firm and industry level. We illustrate these responses
in the simplest possible setting by assuming a Pareto productivity distribution so
that relative prices and the relative value of the productivity cutoﬀs are determined
according to equations (25) and (26).
Proposition 5 A reduction in entry barriers, fe, leads to:
(a) A rise in the zero profit productivity cutoﬀ, ϕ∗, and a rise in the product indif-
ference productivity cutoﬀ, ϕ∗∗
(b) A rise in true average industry productivity due to exit by low productivity firms
(c) Changes in measured firm productivity at surviving firms that switch products
(d) Changes in measured industry productivity due to exit by low productivity firms
and switches in products at surviving firms
Proof. See Appendix.
We begin by tracing the comparative statics for the endogenous variables of the
model and for true industry productivity, before examining the implications for mea-
sured firm and industry productivity. As summarized in Table 3 and proved in the
Appendix, a reduction in barriers to entry (a reduction in the sunk entry cost fe) in-
creases both productivity cutoﬀ levels, thus raising true average productivity in each
product market and for the industry as a whole. The ratio of the productivity cut-
oﬀs, the relative price of the products, the mass of firms producing each product, and
average profitability are unchanged. The expected value of entry falls and welfare
unambiguously rises.
Intuition for these results can be obtained by considering the impact of the reduc-
tion in barriers to entry at the initial steady-state equilibrium. As the sunk entry
cost falls below the expected value of entry, a larger mass of firms, Me, will enter the
industry. For given values of ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗, a larger mass of entrants implies a larger
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mass of firms with productivity realizations high enough to produce in each market.
This rise in the mass of firms producing in each market reduces ex post profitability.
The reduction in ex post profitability means that some low productivity firms
are now no longer able to cover the fixed costs of producing product 1. Hence, in
equilibrium the zero-profit productivity cutoﬀ ϕ∗ rises. As ϕ∗ rises for a given value
of ϕ∗∗, this reduces the mass of firms in product 1 relative to the mass of firms in
product 2, thereby increasing product 1’s relative profitability. Hence, some higher
productivity firms that previously made product 2 now find it more profitable to
produce the low fixed cost product 1 and ϕ∗∗ also rises.
The equilibrium ratio of the two productivity cutoﬀs, ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗, is independent of
the sunk costs of entry, and hence ϕ∗∗ rises by the same proportion as ϕ∗. With a
Pareto productivity distribution, this leaves the relative price of the two products, P,
unchanged.
The implications of the change in barriers to entry for the two productivity cutoﬀs
are summarized graphically in Figure 3. The rise in both ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗ means that
some low productivity firms that previously made product 1 exit, while some higher
productivity firms that previously made product 2 switch to product 1. For both
these reasons, weighted average productivity in product 1, eϕ1, will rise. Since the
firms that switch from product 2 to product 1 are of lower productivity than those
who continue to make product 2, weighted average productivity in product 2, eϕ2, will
also rise.
The rise in ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗ reduces the mass of firms with productivity realizations high
enough to produce in each market for a given mass of firms, Me, that enter. With
a Pareto distribution, this eﬀect exactly oﬀsets the larger mass of firms entering
the industry, so that the mass of firms producing in each product market (M1,M2),
average firm revenue (r¯1, r¯2), and average ex post profitability (π1,π2) are unchanged
at the new steady-state equilibrium.
The expected value of entry, ve, falls to equal the new lower sunk costs of entry, fe,
because the rise in ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗ reduces the probability of a firm having a productivity
realization high enough to be able to profitably manufacture either product 1 or
product 2. Welfare per worker, W , rises because, although the mass of firms and
hence product varieties is unchanged, the rise in average productivity within each
product market reduces average variety prices and hence consumer price indices.
The implications of the fall in entry barriers for true productivity can be sum-
marized as follows. True productivity at the firm-level remains unchanged because
it is drawn from a distribution at the point of entry. True average industry pro-
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ductivity rises due to exit by low productivity firms. Besides these implications for
true productivity, endogenous changes in product by surviving firms have additional
consequences for measured productivity at both the firm and industry level.
Consider the standard superlative index number measures of productivity intro-
duced in equation (28) for the firm and equation (32) for the industry. Higher
productivity surviving firms that switch from product 2 to product 1 may experience
either measured productivity growth or decline depending on whether the variable
cost of production for product 1 is lower or higher than the variable cost of production
for product 2 respectively. For all other surviving firms, measured firm productivity
will remain unchanged.
Measured industry productivity will be influenced both by exit by low productivity
firms and by endogenous changes in product at surviving firms. With an unchanged
relative price for the two products, P, the share of revenue received by a firm making
a given product in equation (32) will remain unchanged. If product 1 has a lower
variable cost of production than product 2, switches in products will reinforce the
increase in measured average industry productivity due to exit by low productivity
firms. If product 1 has a higher variable cost of production than product 2, the
endogenous changes in products will reduce measured average industry productivity,
and if this reduction is large enough to oﬀset the eﬀect of exit by low productivity
firms, measured industry productivity may decline.
We have illustrated the point that endogenous choice between heterogeneous prod-
ucts provides a new margin of adjustment to deregulation that influences measured
firm and industry productivity using standard superlative index number measures of
productivity assuming perfect competition and constant returns to scale. However,
as we showed above, similar biases will aﬀect any other productivity measure where
information on price, cost, output and input is not available at the firm-product level
or where endogenous product choice cannot be modelled using a structural model of
industry equilibrium.
These points are not specific to the particular theoretical framework considered
here. Similar measurement problems will be present whenever firm product choice
is made at a more finely detailed level than observed by empirical researchers and
where products diﬀer in terms of production technique or the way in which they
enter demand. Explicitly modelling the endogenous sorting of firms across products
within industries will help to deepen our understanding of how industries respond to
deregulation and the heterogeneous responses of measured productivity across firms
and industries to exogenous policy reform.
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7. Conclusions
Firms’ decisions about what products to produce are often made at a more dis-
aggregate level than observed by empirical researchers. When products diﬀer in
production techniques or the way in which they enter demand, this aggregation prob-
lem introduces a bias into standard productivity measures. In general, when products
vary in production technique, the standard identifying assumption that technologies
are the same across firms within industries up to a Hicks-neutral or factor augment-
ing productivity shifter will be violated. As a result, productivity measures will be
biased even if firm-specific data is available on prices and costs and on the physical
quantity of output rather than revenue.
The paper develops a theoretical model of industry equilibrium where endoge-
nous self-selection into products may magnify measured productivity dispersion across
firms within industries, and where changes in the relative demand for products may
generate measured industry productivity growth. Measured productivity reflects not
only the true underlying characteristics of firms but also their non-random decision of
what product to produce. The endogenous sorting of firms across products influences
the response of industries to exogenous policy reforms such as industry deregulation.
Reductions in barriers to entry raise true industry productivity due to increased exit
by low productivity firms, but measured firm and industry productivity may either
rise or decline due to endogenous switches by surviving firms between products with
heterogeneous characteristics.
Our analysis suggests a number of areas for further empirical inquiry. Researchers
should make use of existing data on the evolving product mix of firms. In some
instances these data may only be available for particular markets and industries,
but even comprehensive data sources such as the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudi-
nal Research Database contain much information on firms’ product-level production.
Bernard et al. (2005), for example, find that U.S. firms within industries vary sub-
stantially in terms of their product mix.
Further theoretical research is also warranted, particularly in developing richer
models of industry dynamics that allow firms to choose the number and type of
goods they produce. While product choice introduces an additional dimension of
firm heterogeneity to track over time, it promises to yield new insights into how firms,
industries and economies respond to exogenous changes in the economic environment
and policy regime.
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A Appendix: Theoretical Derivations
A1. Weighted Average Productivity and Average Profitability
eϕ1 (ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗) = ∙ 1G (ϕ∗∗)−G (ϕ∗)
Z ϕ∗∗
ϕ∗
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ
¸1/(σ−1)
(33)
eϕ2 (ϕ∗∗) = ∙ 11−G (ϕ∗∗)
Z ∞
ϕ∗∗
ϕσ−1g (ϕ) dϕ
¸1/(σ−1)
Using the relationship between the revenues of firms producing varieties in the
same and in diﬀerent markets, as well as the expression for the zero-profit productivity
cutoﬀ and the CES expenditure share, average profit in the two product markets,
π¯i = πi (ϕ˜i) may be written as follows:
π1(ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗) =
"µeϕ1 (·)
ϕ∗
¶σ−1
− 1
#
f1 (34)
π2(ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗,P) =
"µ
1− a
a
¶ψ µ
1
b
eϕ2 (·)
ϕ∗
¶σ−1
Pσ−ψ − f2
f1
#
f1 (35)
A2. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We begin by determining the equilibrium sextuple: {ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗, P1, P2, R1, R2}.
First, we use the relative supply and relative demand relationships in equations (21)
and (22) to establish that there exist unique equilibrium values of ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗ and P.
Rearranging the product supply relationship, we obtain:
P = b σ−1σ−ψ
µ
a
1− a
¶ ψ
σ−ψ
"µ
ϕ∗∗
ϕ∗
¶1−σ µf2
f1
− 1
¶
+ 1
# 1
σ−ψ
. (36)
Since σ > 1, the right-hand side is monotonically decreasing in ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗ and is graphed
in (P, ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗) space in Figure 2. P takes the value (f2/f1)1/(σ−ψ) (a/(1− a))ψ/(σ−ψ) b(σ−1)/(σ−ψ) >
0 at ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗ = 1 and converges to a lower value of (a/(1− a))ψ/(σ−ψ) b(σ−1)/(σ−ψ) > 0
as ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗ tends to infinity.
Turning now to the product demand relationship (equation (22)), the left-hand side
is monotonically increasing in ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗ and is also graphed in (P, ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗) space below.
As ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗ approaches 1, P converges to 0. As ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗ tends to infinity, P converges
to ∞.
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Therefore, as shown in 2, there exists a unique equilibrium value of (P, ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗)
where both the relative supply and relative demand relationships are satisfied and
where ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗ > 1.
Given values of Λ ≡ ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗ and P, equation (23) is monotonically decreasing in ϕ∗:
dve
dϕ∗
< 0 (37)
⇔ f1
δ
Z Λϕ∗
ϕ∗
ϕσ−1(1− σ)(ϕ∗)−σg(ϕ)dϕ| {z }
Term A
+
f1
δ
Λ
£
Λσ−1 − 1
¤
g(Λϕ∗)| {z }
Term B
+
f1
δ
Z ∞
Λϕ∗
µ
1− a
a
¶ψ µ
1
b
¶σ−1
Pσ−ψϕσ−1(1− σ)(ϕ∗)−σg(ϕ)dϕ| {z }
Term C
−f1
δ
Λ
"µ
1− a
a
¶ψ µ
1
b
¶σ−1
Pσ−ψΛσ−1 − f2
f1
#
g(Λϕ∗)| {z }
Term D
< 0
The sum of Terms B and D may be written as,
f1
δ
Λg(Λϕ∗)
"µ
f2
f1
− 1
¶
− Λσ−1
Ãµ
1− a
a
¶ψ µ
1
b
¶σ−1
Pσ−ψ − 1
!#
.
where, from the definition of Λ in equation (21), the term in square parentheses is
exactly equal to zero. Since σ > 1, Terms A and C in equation (37) are negative.
Hence, dvedϕ∗ < 0 for all ϕ
∗. Furthermore, as ϕ∗ → 0 in equation (23), ve → ∞. As
ϕ∗ → ∞, ve → 0. Together, equations (21), (22) and (23) determine unique equi-
librium values of the three unknowns (ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗,P). Since ϕ∗ > 0 and ϕ∗∗ > ϕ∗ both
products are indeed produced in equilibrium.
These three elements of the equilibrium vector are suﬃcient to determine weighted
average productivity, eϕ1 and eϕ2, in equation (33), as well as average revenue and
hence average profitability, π1 and π2, in equations (34) and (35).
As shown in the main text, the steady-state stability and free entry conditions (equa-
tions (17), (18) and (16)) imply that total revenue, R, is equal to total payments to
labor used in both entry and production, L.
Revenue in each product market may be determined from the CES expenditure share
(equation (4)) at the equilibrium value of relative prices, P, for which we solved
above: R1 = α1(P)L and R2 = (1− α(P))L.
Products and Productivity 34
From consumer and producer optimization, the price indices, P1 and P2, may be writ-
ten as functions of the mass of firms, M1 and M2, and the price charged by a firm
with weighted average productivity, p1(eϕ1) and p2(eϕ2):
P1 = (M1)
1
1−σ p1(eϕ1) = µ α1(P)Lσ(π1 + f1)
¶ 1
1−σ 1
ρeϕ1
P2 = (M2)
1
1−σ p2(eϕ2) = µ(1− α1(P))Lσ(π2 + f2)
¶ 1
1−σ 1
ρeϕ2
where we have used Mi = Ri/ri and (π1, π2, eϕ1, eϕ2) were determined above. We
have thus characterized the equilibrium sextuple {ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗, P1, P2, R1, R2}.
We now show that all other endogenous variables of the model may be derived from
the equilibrium sextuple {ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗, P1, P2, R1, R2}.
From equation (19), (M1,M2) can be expressed as functions of the price indices
(P1, P2) and weighted average productivity (eϕ1, eϕ2) which is determined by (ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗)
alone. From the analysis in the main text, Me = Π/fe = [M1π¯1 +M2π¯2]/fe, where
(M1,M2) have just been determined and (π1, π2) can be derived from (ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗, P).
Total payments to labor used in production in product market i equal the diﬀerence
between revenue, Ri, and total firm profits, Πi, in that market. Therefore:
Lp1 = R1 −Π1 = R1 − (M1π¯1)
Lp2 = R2 −Π2 = R2 − (M2π¯2)
where we have used the choice of labor as numeraire, (R1, R2) are part of the equi-
librium sextuple, (M1,M2) were determined above, and π1 and π2 are functions of
(ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗,P) alone. Payments to labor used in entry are:
Le =Mefe
where Me was determined above.
The first-order conditions for consumer optimization imply:
C1 = R
aψP−ψ1h
aψP 1−ψ1 + (1− a)ψP 1−ψ2
i , C2 = R (1− a)ψP−ψ2h
aψP 1−ψ1 + (1− a)ψP 1−ψ2
i
where R = L and (P1, P2) are part of the equilibrium sextuple.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. This Proposition follows immediately from the Proof of Proposition 1 where
we have established that ϕ∗ > 0 and ϕ∗∗ > ϕ∗.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The Proposition follows immediately from equation (28). Compare a firm
with productivity ϕ0 > ϕ00 making product 2 to a firm with productivity ϕ00 making
product 1. Relative measured productivity of the two firms is equal to:
A (ϕ0)
A (ϕ00)
=
ϕ0
ϕ00
1
b
(38)
D Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. The Proposition follows immediately from Propositions 2 and 3. Since
f2 > f1, product 2 is produced by higher productivity firms. Compare a firm with
productivity ϕ0 > ϕ00 making product 2 to a firm with productivity ϕ00 making product
1. If b2 < b1, then 0 < b < 1, and from equation (38):
A (ϕ0)
A (ϕ00)
>
ϕ0
ϕ00
(39)
E Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. From equation (31) and (4), an increase in the weight of a product in consumer
utility {a, (1− a)} raises the share of revenue allocated to a producer of that product
and reduces the share of revenue allocated to a producer of the other product. If
products diﬀer in terms of their variable cost of production, A2 (ϕ) 6= A1 (ϕ), an
increase in the weight of a product in consumer utility will influence measured industry
productivity through the numerators in equation (32).
From equations (21), (22) and (23), an increase in the weight of a product in consumer
utility {a, (1− a)} will also aﬀect the zero profit and product indiﬀerence productivity
cutoﬀs {ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗} and hence the range of productivities over which the two products
are produced. The share of revenue received, si [Ai (ϕ)], and measured productivity,
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Ai (ϕ), for a producer of true productivity ϕ vary according to which product i she
produces. Therefore, an increase in the weight of the product in consumer utility
will also influence measured industry productivity through the productivity ranges
over which the integrals in equation (32) are evaluated.
F Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. (a) The expected value of entry in (23) is monotonically decreasing in the
zero-profit productivity cutoﬀ ϕ∗. Therefore, as barriers to entry are reduced (a
reduction in the sunk costs of entry fe), the zero-profit productivity cutoﬀ ϕ∗ must
rise so as to reduce the expected value of entry equal to the new lower sunk cost.
Since ϕ∗∗ = Λϕ∗ and Λ is unchanged following the fall in the sunk cost of entry, ϕ∗∗
will rise by the same proportion as ϕ∗ : dϕ∗ > 0, dϕ∗∗ > 0 and d(ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗) = 0.
(b) True weighted average productivity in each product market, eϕ1 and eϕ2, is defined
in equations (33). If productivity is Pareto distributed, g (ϕ) = zkzϕ−(z+1) where
k > 0 and z > 0, it follows that ϕσ−1g(ϕ) = ξh(ϕ) where h (ϕ) = γkγϕ−(γ+1),
ξ ≡ zkz−γ/γ and γ ≡ z−σ+1. That is, h (ϕ) is a Pareto distribution with minimum
productivity k and skewness parameter γ ≡ z − σ + 1, where we assume z > σ − 1
which corresponds to an assumption that the variance of firm sales in the model is
finite. Combining these results, it follows that weighted average productivity in the
two product markets may be expressed as:
eϕ1(ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗)σ−1 = H(ϕ∗∗)−H(ϕ∗)G(ϕ∗∗)−G(ϕ∗) = z(ϕ∗)σ−1γ
∙
1− Λ−γ
1− Λ−z
¸
. (40)
eϕ2(ϕ∗∗)σ−1 = 1−H(ϕ∗∗)1−G(ϕ∗∗) = z(ϕ∗∗)σ−1γ . (41)
where H (ϕ) is the cumulative distribution function corresponding to h (ϕ).
Since σ > 1, and using the results for the change in the productivity cutoﬀs above,
deϕ1 = (deϕ1/dϕ∗)dϕ∗ > 0 and deϕ2 = (deϕ2/dϕ∗∗)dϕ∗∗ > 0. Since true weighted
average productivity rises in each product market individually, true weighted average
productivity in the industry as a whole also rises.
(c) The rise in the product indiﬀerence productivity cutoﬀ„ implies that some higher
productivity surviving firms switch from product 2 to product 1. From equation (28),
the proportional change in measured productivity for a firm of true productivity ϕ0
that switches from product 2 to product 1 is:
ln
µ
A1 (ϕ0)
A2 (ϕ0)
¶
= ln
µ
b2
b1
¶
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which implies measured productivity growth if b1 < b2 or a measured productivity
decline if b2 < b1.
(d) With a Pareto productivity distribution, the relative price, P, in equation (25)
depends solely on ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗. We established above that d (ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗) = 0 and so dP =
0. With an unchanged value of P, the share of revenue received by a firm of a
given productivity in a given product market in equation (31), si [Ai (ϕ)], will remain
unchanged. Following the decline in the sunk costs of entry, measured average
industry productivity in equation (32) will change due to exit by low productivity
firms and due to surviving firms switching from product 2 to product 1. Exit by low
productivity firms will unambiguously raise average industry productivity. Switching
products will change a firm’s measured productivity, as established in (c), and its
share of revenue from producing in another product market, s1 [A (ϕ0)] 6= s2 [A (ϕ0)].
Depending on the relative value of s1 [A (ϕ0)]A (ϕ0) and s2 [A (ϕ0)]A (ϕ0), product
switching by surviving firms may either raise or reduce measured average industry
productivity. The net eﬀect on measured average industry productivity as a result of
exit by low productivity firms and changes in products at surviving firms is therefore
ambiguous.
G Deregulation Comparative Statics
Consider the impact of a reduction in barriers to entry (a reduction in the sunk
costs of entry fe) assuming a Pareto productivity distribution: g (ϕ) = zkzϕ−(z+1),
where k > 0 and z > 0.
The proof of Proposition 5 established a proportional rise in both productivity
cutoﬀs: dϕ∗ > 0, dϕ∗∗ > 0 and d(ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗) = 0. With a Pareto productivity
distribution, the relative price, P, in equation (25) depends solely on ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗ and so
dP = 0.
The proof of Proposition 5 established a rise in weighted average productiv-
ity in each product market individually, deϕ1 = (deϕ1/dϕ∗)dϕ∗ > 0 and deϕ2 =
(deϕ2/dϕ∗∗)dϕ∗∗ > 0, which implies a rise in weighted average productivity in the
industry as a whole.
The change in average revenue, r¯i, and average profitability, π¯i, in equations (34)
and (35) depends upon the change in the ratios of weighted average productivity, eϕ1
and eϕ2, to the zero-profit productivity cutoﬀ, ϕ∗:µeϕ1(ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗)
ϕ∗
¶σ−1
=
H(ϕ∗∗)−H(ϕ∗)
(ϕ∗)σ−1 [G(ϕ∗∗)−G(ϕ∗)] =
z [1− Λ−γ]
γ [1− Λ−z] . (42)
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µeϕ2(ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗)
ϕ∗
¶σ−1
=
1−H(ϕ∗∗)
(ϕ∗)σ−1 [1−G(ϕ∗∗)] =
zΛσ−1
γ
. (43)
With Λ unchanged, dπ1 = 0 and dπ2 = 0.
The mass of firms producing each product is:
M1 =
R1
r1
=
α1(P)L
σ(π1 + f1)
(44)
M2 =
R2
r2
=
(1− α1(P))L
σ(π2 + f2)
.
Since both relative prices, P, and profitability, π1 and π2, are unchanged: dM1 = 0
and dM2 = 0. Welfare per worker is:
W =
h
aψP 1−ψ1 + (1− a)ψP 1−ψ2
i 1
ψ−1
(45)
P1 =
µ
R1
r1
¶ 1
1−σ
p1(eϕ1) = α1(P)Lσ(π1 + f1) 1ρeϕ
P2 =
µ
R2
r2
¶ 1
1−σ
p2(eϕ2) = (1− α1(P))Lσ(π2 + f2) bρeϕ2 .
Average profitability in each market, π1 and π2, is unchanged, while average
productivity, eϕ1 and eϕ2, has risen. Hence, the fall in the sunk cost of entry reduces
the price indices, P1 and P2, and increases welfare per worker, W .
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Figure 1: Profit versus Productivity for the Two Products
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics with Respect to a Reduction in Barriers to Entry
Products and Productivity 42
SIC Description
33 Primary Metal Industries
3357 Nonferrous Wiredrawing and Insulating
33571 Aluminum Wire
33572 Copper Wire
33573 Other Nonferrous Metal Wire
33575 Nonferrous Wire Cloth
33576 Apparatus Wire and Cord Sets
33577 Magnet Wire
33578 Power Wire
3357A Electronic Wire
3357B Telephone Wire
3357C Control Wire
3357D Building Wire
3357E Other Wire NES
33579 Fiber Optic Cable
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau (1996).
P
r
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d
u
c
t
s
Table 1: Five-Digit SIC Products in Four-Digit SIC Industry 3357 (Nonferrous Wire-
drawing and Insulating)
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SIC4 SIC5
Two-Digit SIC Category Industries Products
20 Food 49 157 3.2
21 Tobacco Products 4 6 1.5
22 Textile 23 79 3.4
23 Apparel 31 75 2.4
24 Lumber 17 59 3.5
25 Furniture 13 36 2.8
26 Paper 17 55 3.2
27 Printing and Publishing 14 72 5.1
28 Chemicals 29 102 3.5
29 Petroleum 5 15 3.0
30 Rubber and Plastics 15 63 4.2
31 Leather 11 12 1.1
32 Stone 26 47 1.8
33 Primary Metal 26 89 3.4
34 Fabricated Metal 38 135 3.6
35 Industrial Machinery 51 187 3.7
36 Electronic 37 111 3.0
37 Transportation 18 65 3.6
38 Instruments 17 44 2.6
39 Miscellaneous 18 53 2.9
Notes: Number of industries and products are number of four-
and five-digit SIC categories within the noted two-digit category,
respectively.
Products / 
Industry
Table 2: Products and Industries across Sectors
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dϕ∗ > 0 dϕ∗∗ > 0
d (ϕ∗∗/ϕ∗) = 0 dP = 0
deϕ1(ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗) > 0 deϕ2(ϕ∗∗) > 0
dr¯1 = 0 dr¯2 = 0
dπ¯1 = 0 dπ¯2 = 0
dM1 = 0 dM2 = 0
dve < 0 dW > 0
Table 3: Comparative Statics with Respect to a Reduction in Barriers to Entry (a
fall in sunk entry costs fe) .
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